The regulatory stringency of New York insurance law, along with its extraterritorial application, makes it unique among state regulatory jurisdictions. This is the first study to simultaneously examine the relation between a broad array of firm-specific characteristics and the probability of being licensed in New York. We make predictions about expected characteristics of New York licensed life insurers, and then empirically test our hypotheses. The results strongly support the hypotheses. In addition, confirming the importance of extraterritorial regulation, we find very few systematic differences between domestic New York insurers and foreign New York insurers.
INTRODUCTION
The state of New York is generally acknowledged to have the most rigorous insurance regulatory scheme of any jurisdiction in the United States (Meier 1988; Cummins and Sommer 1996) . Besides general stringency, a unique feature of New York insurance law is its extraterritoriality; an insurer licensed to do business in New York must substantially comply with any requirement applicable to similar domestic insurers in every state in which the insurer does business. For example, New York investment laws and agent compensation rules must be followed nationwide by insurers licensed in New York. The extraterritorial application of New York insurance law originated with an administrative ruling in 1900 known as the "Appleton Rule," which was made part of the New York insurance code in 1939 (Vaughan and Vaughan 1995) .
The impact of New York regulation on the life insurance industry is potentially far reaching considering that over fifty-eight percent of life insurer assets in 1995 were held by New York licensed life insurers. Further, many industry authorities believe that being licensed to operate in New York is a positive indicator of financial quality (Black and Skipper 1994, 307) . However, many insurers appear to intentionally avoid becoming licensed in New York. In 1995, 138 life insurers were licensed in forty-nine states of the United States. In 134 (97.1 percent) of these cases, the single state in which the insurer did not have a license was New York.
As a consequence of the apparent unique importance of New York regulation, many empirical researchers have attempted to control for the impact of such regulation in studies of various insurance issues, typically by including a binary variable signifying whether an insurer is licensed in New York (for example, Brewer, Mondschean, and Strahan 1997; Pottier and Sommer 1997a; Cummins and Sommer 1996; Wells, Cox and Gaver 1995; and Boose 1990) . Despite this widespread recognition of the importance of New York regulation, no previous study has focused specifically on the characteristics of New York licensed life insurers. The purpose of this study is to identify these characteristics.
Previous research on New York regulation is very limited. Weisbart (1975) used New York licensure as an independent variable in seven separate regressions to explain observed commissions, expenses, growth, and rates of return. His regression analysis included a total of sixty-five life insurers. A survey of companies not licensed in New York revealed that eighty-five percent stated they did not seek admission to New York to avoid the Appleton Rule (Weisbart 1975, 43) . Harrington (1982) examined New York Regulation 49, which limits general agency expense allowances. He conducted a survey of fifty-one insurers to determine the potential costs and benefits of Regulation 49. We use a much larger data set than these two earlier studies. In addition, this is the first study to simultaneously examine the relation between a broad array of firm-specific characteristics and the probability of being licensed in New York. Given the widespread assertion that New York regulated insurers are somehow different, it is important to know the extent to which this is true, and to know in exactly what ways they tend to differ from other insurers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the two primary ways of entering the New York insurance market. The following section discusses hypotheses regarding the expected relationship between specific firm characteristics and the probability of being licensed in New York. Next, the sample, data and methodology are described, and the empirical results are presented. The final section contains a summary and conclusions.
ENTRY INTO THE NEW YORK INSURANCE MARKET
Insurers can enter New York as a domiciled or foreign insurer. An existing insurer domiciled outside New York can either establish a subsidiary domiciled in New York or obtain a license to operate in New York as a foreign insurer. Whichever method of entry is used, any insurer licensed in New York must substantially comply with the New York insurance code not only in New York, but in all other states where the insurer does business (the so-called Appleton Rule). The legal costs of incorporation and the maintenance of books and records provide an incentive to operate as a foreign insurer rather than to establish and maintain a New York-domiciled subsidiary. On the other hand, the extraterritorial dimension of New York's stringent insurance law, with the accompanying high regulatory compliance costs, provides an incentive to enter New York via a domiciled subsidiary in order to avoid subjecting the insurer's nationwide operations to New York regulations (Petroni and Shakelford 1995) .
In the empirical analysis to follow, our primary interest is in examining the systematic differences between insurers that are licensed in New York, and thus subject to New York regulation wherever they operate, and those that are not. As a secondary issue, we further test for systematic differences within the subset of insurers licensed in New York; namely, differences between New York domiciled insurers and New York foreign insurers. Klein (1995, 381) claims that "states tend to concentrate solvency oversight on their domestic insurers and defer the responsibility for other insurers to their domiciliary jurisdiction." Thus, the application of New York regulation may differ between foreign and domestic insurers even where the formal written regulations do not. If New York domiciled insurers are systematically different from other New York licensed insurers then this would be evidence consistent with differential effects of domiciliary regulation versus extraterritorial regulation.
HYPOTHESES REGARDING NEW YORK LICENSED LIFE INSURERS
In this section, we discuss expected differences in specific firm characteristics between insurers that are licensed in New York and those that are not. Some additional details regarding New York regulations are provided in this section as well. Individual company-level data is used in the empirical analysis because insurers are regulated primarily at the individual company rather than the group level.
Investments
New York restricts the proportion of assets invested in common stocks, real estate, and non-investment grade bonds (Kamen and Toppeta 1989) . These investments are characterized by historically higher risk. If New York's investment laws are more stringent than other states, New York licensed insurers are expected to have a lower proportion of their assets invested in these types of assets than non-New York licensed firms.
1 The three investment measures used in our empirical model are: real estate investments to admitted assets; common stock investments to admitted assets; and junk bonds to total bond investments.
1 Given the complexity of investment regulation, it is difficult to make a definitive overall statement about the level of stringency of a particular state. Conventional wisdom seems to be that New York's investment regulations are stringent. Meier (1988, 60-64) , for example, provides a discussion of insurer investment restrictions in which he refers to New York as "the most restrictive state." However, the formal percentage restrictions on risky asset categories for New York are not unique in their stringency. For example, fourteen states have the same ten percent restriction on common stock investments as New York (NAIC 1997). Our empirical analysis will test whether the investment characteristics of New York licensed insurers are consistent with New York having generally more stringent investment regulations.
Separate Account Assets
State investment regulations apply to general account assets only, not separate account assets. A primary purpose of separate accounts is to make investments exempt from the usual investment restrictions imposed by state law (Black and Skipper 1994, 917) . Insurers that want to enter the New York market, but want to avoid incurring some of the costs of complying with investment restrictions, can do so by focusing on separate account business. In effect, the stringency of New York investment regulations may provide an incentive to New York licensed insurers to be relatively more involved in separate accounts business than non-New York insurers. Our separate account variable is defined as the percentage of admitted assets held in separate accounts.
Capital Adequacy
Historically, state solvency regulation has concentrated on an insurer's capital position (Klein 1995) . The most important modern measure of capital adequacy is the risk based capital ratio, defined as total adjusted capital divided by the authorized control level; both of which are calculated based on NAIC formulae. If New York is more stringent in its capital regulation, then New York licensed insurers would be expected to have higher risk-based capital ratios.
Commissions
The New York insurance code places limits on insurer general expenses and agent commissions. The limits are expressed as formulae based on percentages of firstyear life insurance premiums and annuity considerations, renewal premiums, and aggregate amounts of life insurance in force (Kamen and Toppeta 1989) . If the insurer does not conduct business in New York state, agents' commission rates usually are larger (Black and Skipper 1994, 958) . Life insurers licensed in New York are thus expected to have lower commissions relative to premiums written. The commission variable in the model is defined as commissions incurred on direct business divided by direct premiums written (DPW). Boose (1990) conjectures that if agents of New York regulated insurers receive less of their compensation in the form of commissions due to regulatory restrictions, then they may receive more in the form of other benefits, such as training, group insurance benefits, and office support. Harrington (1982) claims that the New York general expense limitations should reduce the ability to increase general expenses to offset lower commissions. If these expense limitations were effective, then we would not expect New York licensed insurers to have higher general expenses to compensate for lower commissions. Harrington notes that New York licensed insurers may have higher general expenses because the stringent regulation increases the cost of regulatory compliance. The general insurance expense variable is defined as general insurance expenses divided by direct premiums written.
General Insurance Expenses

Number of States Licensed
Since New York regulation is highly restrictive and applies on an extraterritorial basis, insurers have an incentive to enter New York through a domiciliary arrangement rather than as a foreign insurer so that the whole company will not be subject to New York regulation. The New York subsidiary would not be expected to be licensed in many other states, since the purpose of setting up the subsidiary is to isolate the impact of New York regulation. Thus, we expect that New York licensed insurers will tend to be licensed in fewer states due to the practice of establishing subsidiaries in order to limit the impact of New York regulation on non-New York operations. Note that some insurers, of course, do choose to enter New York as licensed foreign insurers rather than through a subsidiary, presumably because for them the regulatory compliance costs would be less than the costs of incorporating and operating a subsidiary.
Group Membership
As argued above, the highly restrictive nature of New York insurance regulations creates an incentive to enter New York as a domiciled insurer rather than as a foreign insurer. Because of the tendency of many insurers to enter New York through a subsidiary arrangement, New York licensed insurers are more likely to be members of a group of insurance companies. An unaffiliated single company could obtain a license to conduct business in New York, but their operations in every state would then be required to comply with New York insurance law. A binary variable indicating group membership is included in the model. Mayers and Smith (1981 , 1988 develop hypotheses regarding the ability of different organizational forms to control the incentive conflicts among managers, policyholders, and owners in insurance companies. These authors claim that mutual insurers should be involved in activities requiring less managerial discretion. Stringent extraterritorial regulation reduces authorized managerial discretion, which should be associated with mutuals. As Mayers and Smith observe, the owner-policyholder conflict is more severe in mutuals because monitoring by capital markets is virtually absent in the mutual. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that regulators can act as surrogate monitors. The more restrictive nature of New York regulation compared to other states would tend to lower the agency costs of mutuals related to owner-policyholder conflicts. Consequently, both the managerial discretion hypothesis of Mayers and Smith and the surrogate monitoring by regulators imply that mutuals are more likely to become licensed in New York. A binary variable for organizational form, which equals one for mutual insurers and zero for stock insurers, is included in the model.
Organizational Form
Size and Age
In addition to the preceding variables that are hypothesized to be related to New York regulation, the model also includes control variables for firm size and age. Size is a standard control variable meant to account for the fact that firm size potentially influences many of the operating characteristics of an insurer (Cummins and Zi 1998) . Thus, a variable defined as the natural log of total admitted assets is included. In focusing on characteristics of New York regulated insurers, it also seems important to control for age. Since many of the oldest life insurers are domiciled in New York, we want to assure that our results are not influenced by an age effect that is not controlled for, so we include a variable for the number of years the firm has been in operation.
Business Mix
Finally, three variables are included to control for the business mix of the insurer: the percent of total direct premium written represented by life insurance, the percent of DPW represented by annuities, and the percent of DPW from group rather than individual insurance. Certain other variables in the model, such as commissions and expenses and investment mix, may be influenced by the business mix of the insurer, so it is important to include these business mix variables as controls. In addition, business mix may also be influenced by regulation. If New York's commission limitations are more important in some lines than in others, agents of New York licensed insurers may be expected to write less business in the most commission-constrained lines.
SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our data come from the NAIC life-health insurer tapes containing data for the 1995 statement year. We use data for all firms on the NAIC tapes that have positive direct and net premiums written. This set of firms accounts for over ninety-eight percent of total life insurance industry assets. Our sample consists of 1127 insurers, of which 159 are licensed in New York. Table 1 contains selected summary statistics on the sample. Probit regression analysis is used to test our hypotheses regarding the characteristics of New York licensed life insurers.
2 The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the life insurer is licensed in New York and 0 otherwise. A positive coefficient indicates that a higher value of that explanatory variable is associated with a higher probability of being a New York licensed insurer. Similar models have been used in the insurance literature previously by Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), Mayers and Smith (1994) , and Kim, Mayers and Smith (1996) . In the same way that these papers use logistic regression to analyze systematic differences between stock insurers and mutual insurers, or between insurers using exclusive agency or independent agency systems, we use a probit model to analyze systematic differences between insurers that are licensed in New York and those that are not.
3 Results are also presented for two other probit regressions examining particular subsets of the full data set. Where evidence of heteroskedasticity is found, the results presented are heteroskedasticity-adjusted.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the primary regression appear in Table 2 . Model 1 of Table 2 is a standard probit regression and Model 2 is a probit regression involving instrumental variables, to be discussed below. The discussion here will focus on the results for Model 1. The results make it clear that there are indeed numerous significant systematic differences between life insurers that are subject to New York regulation and those that are not. Eleven of the fifteen variables in the model (excluding the intercept) have coefficients that are significant at better than the ten percent level. All the signs on the significant coefficients are consistent with the hypothesis presented above.
The results yield several important implications. First, New York licensed insurers invest less of their general account assets than other insurers in the risky asset category of common stock. This has been an apparent goal of New York regulators, given the regulatory restrictions on investments in stocks. Unlike common stock, real estate is not significant in the model. It also appears that New York licensed life insurers may attempt to circumvent New York's investment restrictions to some extent by emphasizing products that utilize separate accounts, which are free from such restrictions. As the results show, New York licensed insurers hold a significantly larger proportion of their total assets in separate accounts than non-New York licensed insurers. Interestingly, while investment mix seems to differ between New York licensed insurers and other insurers, risk-based capital ratios do not. This is perhaps surprising given the focus on capital ratios in solvency regulation. 6 To further investigate this issue, we tried replacing the risk-based capital ratio with the simple capital to asset ratio. Again, this variable was insignificant, and other results were unaffected.
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The restrictions on agent commissions imposed by New York insurance law appear to have a significant impact, with New York licensed insurers having lower commissions as a percent of direct premiums written than other life insurers. However, the general expenses variable has a significantly positive coefficient. This could be interpreted as supporting the argument put forward by Boose (1990) that lower commissions may be at least partially offset with higher general expenses, as insurers attempt to compensate their agents in ways other than commissions. The result is also consistent with the argument of Harrington (1982) that New York regulated insurers may have higher general expenses due to increased regulatory compliance costs. Regardless, the results do not provide evidence of the effectiveness of New York's Regulation 49, which limits general expenses in an attempt to prevent insurers from offsetting commissions with other expenses. Of course, it is possible that general expenses for New York insurers would be even higher without Regulation 49.
The coefficient on the binary variable indicating whether an insurer is a member of a group is positive and significant, while the coefficient on the variable indicating the number of states in which the insurer is licensed is negative and significant. Both of these results provide support for the notion that many insurers attempt to limit the impact of New York extraterritorial regulation on their operations by entering New York through the establishment of a subsidiary licensed in only a limited number of states rather than through a license.
As shown by the size and age coefficients, New York licensed insurers tend to be larger and older than non-New York insurers. The results also indicate that insurers that are licensed in New York are more likely to be mutuals than are nonNew York licensed insurers. As described in the previous section, this is consistent with both the managerial discretion hypothesis of Mayers and Smith (1981 , 1988 , as well as the surrogate monitoring hypothesis of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . However, further analysis indicates that the association between mutual and New York is perhaps just an historical artifact. If only firms less than seventy-five years old are included in the sample, mutual and age are no longer significant while the remaining results are qualitatively unchanged.
7 Thus, firms older than seventy-five years seem to be driving the result on the mutual variable. 8 The presence of these very old firms in New York is probably due to historical factors that have nothing to do with current New York insurance regulation.
Lastly, the line of business variable results indicate that New York licensed insurers tend to write less life insurance and annuities (and thus more health insurance). No significance is found with the group insurance variable. The life and annuity results may indicate that commission restrictions make these lines less attractive for agents to sell, or may simply reflect non-regulatory demand-side factors.
One potential concern with an analysis such as this is that many of the variables in the model might properly be considered as endogenous. For example, it may be that New York regulations cause New York insurers to invest less in stocks, or it may be that insurers choose to license in New York because they already meet New York's investment restrictions. This is an issue that arises in many studies using firm-level data. Many of these studies either ignore the issue or acknowledge it but do not address it econometrically. 9 We attempt to go further than these studies by explicitly testing for exogeneity with several of our variables. Using the test described in Maddala (1992, 395) , we are unable to reject the hypothesis that our test variables are exogenous. Maddala states that this result means that these variables "can be treated as exogenous" (Maddala, 1992, 395) . 10 An alternative to performing a formal test for endogeneity would be to simply assume that certain variables are endogenous based on intuition, and then econometrically treat them as endogenous. We also tried this approach. We chose general expenses and investment in common stocks as two key potentially endogenous variables. We then reran our model using instrumental variables for these two variables.
11 The results are presented as Model 2 of Table 2 . As can be seen, the general expense variable is no longer significant, but the common stock variable remains significant. The only other major change in the results is that the line of business control variables are no longer significant. Thus, one should perhaps interpret the result for the expense variable with caution due to possible endogeneity of this variable.
Group Members Licensed in New York
Another potential concern with the analysis presented above is that it includes such a wide variety of firms-single unaffiliated firms and group members, regional and national firms, large and small firms. To test for the robustness of our results, we ran our model on a subset of the original data set. This subset contains only firms that are members of groups in which at least one group member is licensed in New York. In other words, all single unaffiliated firms were eliminated, as well as firms in groups where no group member is licensed in New York. This set of 346 firms is a much more homogeneous sample of firms. Since important decisions regarding investments and other matters are made at the group or parent company level, group members might be expected to have more in common than unaffiliated firms. Consequently, finding significant differences between group members that are 9 For example, Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), Mayers and Smith (1994) , Kim, Mayers, and Smith (1996) . In the Kim, Mayers, and Smith (1996) study of distributions systems the authors state, "Ideally, we would provide a system of simultaneous equations to reflect the jointness in the determination of distribution systems, ownership structure, and advertising policy. Unfortunately, the theory currently is not rich enough to provide the necessary identifying restrictions to estimate such a system" (p. 214). Thus, they run a standard logistic regression. 10 Specifically, we tested the following set of variables for exogeneity: common stocks/assets, real estate/assets, junk bonds/total bonds, commissions/DPW, general expenses/DPW, and separate account assets/total assets. Various subsets of these variables were also tested. In no case were we able to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the five percent level. 11 For the stocks equation, the instruments used were ln(assets), group affiliation dummy, mutual dummy, capital-to-assets ratio, number of states licensed, and percent of direct premium written from seven lines of business (industrial life, ordinary life, individual annuities, group life, group annuities, group accident and health, other accident and health). For the general expense equation, the instruments were ln(assets), group affiliation dummy, mutual dummy, number of states licensed, a geographic Herfindahl index, a line of business Herfindahl index, and percent of direct premium written from the seven lines of business mentioned above. Note that the presence of capital-to-assets in the stocks equation, of the Herfindahl indices in the expense equation, and of age and separate accounts in the probit equation assures that the equations are identified.
licensed in New York and other affiliated firms that are not licensed in New York would be a powerful result. It would mean that even within groups of affiliated firms, the members that are licensed in New York differ systematically from the members that are not.
Summary statistics for this sample appear in Table 3 and the probit results using this subset of data are presented in Table 4 . The only difference in the variable set used here and the one used in all other regressions is that the group binary variable does not appear, since all firms in the data set are group members. The results are striking. Even having reduced our sample size by almost seventy percent, and using firms that might be expected to have more in common than our original data set, we still find significant differences between group members that are licensed in New York and those that are not. Of the ten variables in this model which were significant in the previous model, seven remain significant at the ten percent level. Of the three that are now insignificant, two are only marginally so, with age having a p-value of 0.12 and separate accounts have a p-value of 0.1045. All of the signs of the coefficients that were significant in Table 2 remain the same in this estimation. As with the model of Table 2 , we reran this model treating the general expense and common stock variables as endogenous. Once again, the general expense variable loses significance but the common stock variable remains significant.
Foreign Insurers versus Domiciled Insurers
The results above clearly demonstrate that significant differences exist between life insurers that are licensed in New York and those that are not. These were the logical groups to compare to see the impact of New York regulation, since all insurers licensed in New York are subject to New York regulation. However, a reasonable next question might be to ask whether or not significant differences exist between firms in the two categories of New York licensed insurers; namely, insurers that are domiciled in New York and those that are licensed in New York but domiciled elsewhere (i.e., foreign insurers). Based on a literal application of New York insurance regulation to foreign insurers, there would be no reason for domestic and foreign insurers to exhibit systematic differences due to regulation, since all of them are subject to New York regulation due to its extraterritorial reach. However, as discussed in Section II, Klein (1995) contends that there may be reasons to expect regulators to behave differently toward domestic insurers compared to foreign insurers. To test for this possibility, we ran another probit regression, this one comparing New York domestic insurers with foreign insurers. A positive coefficient indicates that a higher value of that explanatory variable is associated with a higher probability of being a New York domiciled insurer. The sample in this regression consists of ninety-two domestic insurers and sixty-seven foreign insurers. Summary statistics for the sample appear in Table 5 and the probit results are presented in Table 6 . Since endogeneity is not of concern here, only one set of results is presented. As can be seen, in stark contrast to the results when comparing New York licensed firms with non-New York licensed firms, we find considerably fewer systematic differences between domestic and foreign insurers. Significant variables include size and the number of states in which the firm is licensed, with the coefficients indicating that domestic insurers tend to be smaller and licensed in fewer states than foreign insurers. This is as would be expected given our argument that many domestic New York insurers were established as subsidiaries to isolate the impact of New York regulation. Interestingly, the real estate variable is significant and positive, indicating the New York domiciled firms tend to hold a greater proportion of assets in real estate than foreign firms. Two of the line of business variables are also significant, the percent of business in life insurance and in annuities. There is no apparent regulatory reason why business mix should differ between domiciled and foreign New York insurers, since all must follow the same commission and expense restrictions, so these results are likely simply driven by market demand or some other non-regulatory factors. Overall, the results of this regression demonstrate that New York regulators do not appear to enforce regulations to a significantly different degree for domestic insurers and foreign insurers, so these two groups of firms do not exhibit the dramatic differences found between New York licensed firms and those not licensed in New York. Number of Firms 92 67 The Wilcoxon z-statistic is reported for medians. The chi-square statistic is reported for group membership and organizational form since these variables are categorical. *Significant at ten percent level. **Significant at five percent level. ***Significant at one percent level. 
CONCLUSION
This study has examined the systematic differences between life insurers that are licensed in New York and those that are not. It has long been assumed that New York licensed life insurers are different, as evidenced by the fact that many studies use New York-licensed status as a control variable in regressions. Our findings suggest that attempting to control for the impact of New York regulation is quite valid, as there are numerous significant differences between the population of insurers that are licensed in New York and those that are not. We find that New York licensed insurers tend to invest less in common stocks, have lower commissions but higher general expenses, hold more of their assets in separate accounts, and are more likely to be mutuals, to be members of insurer groups, and to be licensed in fewer states. The results are consistent with the notion that New York regulation of life insurers is generally more stringent than that of other states. As a further test of the robustness of the results, we look at the subset of firms that belong to groups in which at least one group member is licensed in New York, with the expectation that this subsample is likely to be more homogeneous than the full sample. Again, we find numerous systematic differences between firms that are licensed in New York and their fellow group members that are not licensed in New York, reinforcing our full sample conclusions.
We also find evidence that many insurers wishing to enter the New York market choose to do so by establishing a New York subsidiary rather than obtaining a New York license. However, we do not find many significant differences between characteristics of New York domiciled insurers and New York licensed foreign insurers, consistent with extraterritorial application of New York insurance law.
